Tamara Dobler: Two conceptions of Wittgenstein’s contextualism

Tamara Dobler: Two conceptions of Wittgenstein’s contextualism


“How should we understand Wittgenstein’s proposals that ‘the meaning of a
word is its use in the language’ (Wittgenstein 1953, §43) and that a nameonly has a meaning in a language-game (ibid. §49)? Are they incompatiblewith occasion-invariant semantics? In this paper I present two leadinginterpretations of Wittgenstein’s contextualism: James Conant’s meaning-eliminativism (ME) and Charles Travis’s meaning-underdetermination(MU). I argue that, even though these two interpretations are very similar,the latter gives a more nuanced account of Wittgenstein’s contextualismthat doesn’t involve a commitment to the claim that words have no meaningoutside immediate contexts of use.”

  • 1. Against the ‘incompatible context’ interpretation of nonsense
  • 2. Eliminating meanings
  • 3. Meaning-underdetermination
  • 4. The status of language-games
  • 5. Nonsense and linguistic understanding

Tamara Dobler: Two conceptions of Wittgenstein’s contextualism
Lodz Papers in Pragmatics. Special issue on “Context and Contextualism”
(ed. Piotr Stalmaszczyk).

Advertisements

Leave a Reply

Fill in your details below or click an icon to log in:

WordPress.com Logo

You are commenting using your WordPress.com account. Log Out / Change )

Twitter picture

You are commenting using your Twitter account. Log Out / Change )

Facebook photo

You are commenting using your Facebook account. Log Out / Change )

Google+ photo

You are commenting using your Google+ account. Log Out / Change )

Connecting to %s