Michael Huemer: Epistemology Papers

Michael Huemer: Epistemology Papers

  • Dissertation
    A direct realist account of perceptual awareness
  • Probability & Coherence
    Refutation of BonJour’s argument for coherentism. Appeared in Southern Journal of Philosophy, Winter 1997.
  • Confirmation Theory
    Discussion of the problem of induction, some failed solutions to it, and my favored approach: inference to the best explanation
  • The Problem of Defeasible Justification
    Sets forth a general skeptical argument concerning defeasible justification. Generalizes on problem of induction and Cartesian/brain-in-the-vat skepticism. Close attention to general logical/epistemological principles the problem depends on
  • The Problem of Memory Knowledge
    Why are we justified in believing what we seem to remember? I refute three natural theories of this and then present my own solution
  • Sense Data
    Article from the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy
  • Explanation & Inductive Logic
    Explains how the notion of explanatory priority helps us to properly interpret the Principle of Indifference, leading to a defense of induction
  • Skepticism and the Veil of Perception
    Information about and excerpts from the book

Gerhard Ernst: Der Wissensbegriff in der Diskussion

Gerhard Ernst:  Der Wissensbegriff in der Diskussion

“Die Analyse des Wissensbegriffs ist eine der Hauptaufgaben der Erkenntnistheorie. Dies spiegelt die aktuelle Diskussion wieder: Nachdem die enorme Flut von Aufsätzen, die Edmund L. Gettiers Frage „Is Justified True Belief Knowledge?“ 1963 ausgelöst hatte, in den 80er Jahren zusehends abebbte, hat gerade das letzte Jahrzehnt wieder eine Fülle von interessanten Neuansätzen und Weiterentwicklungen bekannter Positionen gebracht.”

  • 1. Grundlagen
  • 2. Internalistische Theorien des Wissens
  • 3. Externalistische Theorien des Wissens
  • 4. Naturalisierte Erkenntnistheorie
  • 5. Tugendepistemologie
  • 6. Kontextualistische Theorien des Wissens
  • 7. Jenseits des Kontextualismus

Certain Doubts

Certain Doubts

Certain Doubts, a blog devoted to matters epistemic, began on June 9, 2004. The blog was originally sponsored by the University of Missouri when its administrator Jonathan L. Kvanvig was professor of philosophy and chair of the philosophy department there. It has since moved to Baylor University, being housed there since the fall of 2006.

The list of contributors is a who’s who of contemporary epistemology, and any epistemologists who are not on the list should feel free to contact the site administrator if they wish to be a contributor.

“Epistemology” @ SEP

sepEpistemology @ Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy

Keith Korcz: The Epistemology Research Guide

Keith Korcz: The Epistemology Research Guide

“Epistemology” @ IEP

Epistemology @ Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy

  1. Kinds of Knowledge
  2. The Nature of Propositional Knowledge
    1. Belief
    2. Truth
    3. Justification
    4. The Gettier Problem
      1. The No-False-Belief Condition
      2. The No-Defeaters Condition
      3. Causal Accounts of Knowledge
  3. The Nature of Justification
    1. Internalism
      1. Foundationalism
      2. Coherentism
    2. Externalism
  4. The Extent of Human Knowledge
    1. Sources of Knowledge
    2. Skepticism
    3. Cartesian Skepticism
    4. Humean Skepticism
      1. Numerical vs. Qualitative Identity
      2. Hume’s Skepticism about Induction
  5. Conclusion
  6. References and Further Reading

Theory of Knowledge

Theory of Knowledge

Edmund Gettier: Is Justified True Belief Knowledge?

Much ado about contemporary skepticism has to do with a famously concise article Is Justified True Belief Knowledge? by Edmund L. Gettier that appeared in Analysis 23 (1963), pp. 121-123.

Thanks to the permission of the author and the efforts of Andrew Chrucky it is also available as a hypertext transcription at:

Various attempts have been made in recent years to state necessary and sufficient conditions for someone’s knowing a given proposition. The attempts have often been such that they can be stated in a form similar to the following:

a. S knows that P IFF
  • P is true,
  • S believes that P, and
  1. S is justified in believing that P.

For example, Chisholm has held that the following gives the necessary and sufficient conditions for knowledge:

b. S knows that P IFF
  • S accepts P,
  • S has adequate evidence for P, and
  1. P is true.

Ayer has stated the necessary and sufficient conditions for knowledge as follows:

c. S knows that P IFF
  • P is true,
  • S is sure that P is true, and
  1. S has the right to be sure that P is true.

I shall argue that (a) is false in that the conditions stated therein do not constitute a sufficient condition for the truth of the proposition that S knows that P. The same argument will show that (b) and (c) fail if ‘has adequate evidence for’ or ‘has the right to be sure that’ is substituted for ‘is justified in believing that’ throughout.

Some related resources: