Michael Huemer: Epistemology Papers

Michael Huemer: Epistemology Papers

• Dissertation
  A direct realist account of perceptual awareness
• Probability & Coherence
  Refutation of BonJour’s argument for coherentism. Appeared in Southern Journal of Philosophy, Winter 1997.
• Confirmation Theory
  Discussion of the problem of induction, some failed solutions to it, and my favored approach: inference to the best explanation
• The Problem of Defeasible Justification
  Sets forth a general skeptical argument concerning defeasible justification. Generalizes on problem of induction and Cartesian/brain-in-the-vat skepticism. Close attention to general logical/epistemological principles the problem depends on
• The Problem of Memory Knowledge
  Why are we justified in believing what we seem to remember? I refute three natural theories of this and then present my own solution
• Sense Data
  Article from the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy
• Explanation & Inductive Logic
  Explains how the notion of explanatory priority helps us to properly interpret the Principle of Indifference, leading to a defense of induction
• Skepticism and the Veil of Perception
  Information about and excerpts from the book

Gerhard Ernst: Der Wissensbegriff in der Diskussion

Gerhard Ernst:  Der Wissensbegriff in der Diskussion

“Die Analyse des Wissensbegriffs ist eine der Hauptaufgaben der Erkenntnistheorie. Dies spiegelt die aktuelle Diskussion wieder: Nachdem die enorme Flut von Aufsätzen, die Edmund L. Gettiers Frage „Is Justified True Belief Knowledge?“ 1963 ausgelöst hatte, in den 80er Jahren zusehends abebbte, hat gerade das letzte Jahrzehnt wieder eine Fülle von interessanten Neuansätzen und Weiterentwicklungen bekannter Positionen gebracht.”

• 1. Grundlagen
• 2. Internalistische Theorien des Wissens
• 3. Externalistische Theorien des Wissens
• 4. Naturalisierte Erkenntnistheorie
• 5. Tugendepistemologie
• 6. Kontextualistische Theorien des Wissens
• 7. Jenseits des Kontextualismus

Certain Doubts

Certain Doubts

Certain Doubts, a blog devoted to matters epistemic, began on June 9, 2004. The blog was originally sponsored by the University of Missouri when its administrator Jonathan L. Kvanvig was professor of philosophy and chair of the philosophy department there. It has since moved to Baylor University, being housed there since the fall of 2006.

The list of contributors is a who’s who of contemporary epistemology, and any epistemologists who are not on the list should feel free to contact the site administrator if they wish to be a contributor.

• Decade and Longitudinal Journal Information
• Epistemology Course Slides
• Talks: Slides and Videos
• Complete Hirsch Number Rankings of U.S. Philosophy PhD Programs
• Philosophy Journal Information: ESF Rankings, Citation Impact & Rejection Rates
• About Certain Doubts
• Contributors

Keith deRose: The Epistemology Page

Keith de Rose: The Epistemology Page

• 1. Some Epistemology courses with Syllabi/Information On-Line
• 2. Graduate Programs strong in epistemology
• 3. Some Epistemologists and Some of Their Epistemological Publications
      A . C . F . H . K . M . R . T .
• 4. Other Epistemology sites

“Epistemology” @ SEP

Epistemology @ Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy

• 1. What is Knowledge?
  • 1.1 Knowledge as Justified True Belief
  • 1.2 The Gettier Problem
• 2. What is Justification?
  • 2.1 Deontological and Non-Deontological justification
  • 2.2 Evidence vs. Reliability
  • 2.3 Internal vs. External
  • 2.4 Why Internalism?
  • 2.5 Why Externalism?
• 3. The Structure of Knowledge and Justification
  • 3.1 Foundationalism
  • 3.2 Coherentism
  • 3.3 Why Foundationalism?
  • 3.4 Why Coherentism?
• 4. Sources of Knowledge and Justification
  • 4.1 Perception
  • 4.2 Introspection
  • 4.3 Memory
  • 4.5 Reason
  • 4.6 Testimony
• 5. The Limits of Knowledge and Justification
  • 5.1 The Case for Skepticism
  • 5.2 Skepticism and Closure
  • 5.3 Relevant Alternatives and Denying Closure
  • 5.4 The Moorean Response
  • 5.5 The Contextualist Response
  • 5.6 The Ambiguity Response
  • 5.7 Knowing One Isn’t a BIV
• 6. Additional Issues
  • 6.1 Virtue Epistemology
  • 6.2 Naturalistic Epistemology
  • 6.3 Religious Epistemology
  • 6.4 Moral Epistemology
  • 6.5 Social Epistemology
  • 6.6 Feminist Epistemology
• Bibliography
• Academic Tools
• Other Internet Resources
• Related Entries

Keith Korcz: The Epistemology Research Guide

Keith Korcz: The Epistemology Research Guide

• 1. Some Detailed Epistemology Course Pages
• 2. Links to Links to Philosophy Papers On the Web
• 3. Other Sites Devoted to Contemporary Analytic Epistemology
• 4. Epistemology Blogs
• 5. Bibliographic Resources in Epistemology
• 6. Encyclopedia Articles on Epistemology
• 7. Buying Philosophy Books Online
• 8. Links To 1247 Online Papers In Contemporary Analytic Epistemology + Epistemologist’s Home Pages

“Epistemology” @ IEP

Epistemology @ Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy

1. Kinds of Knowledge
2. The Nature of Propositional Knowledge
   1. Belief
   2. Truth
   3. Justification
   4. The Gettier Problem
      1. The No-False-Belief Condition
      2. The No-Defeaters Condition
      3. Causal Accounts of Knowledge
3. The Nature of Justification
   1. Internalism
      1. Foundationalism
      2. Coherentism
   2. Externalism
4. The Extent of Human Knowledge
   1. Sources of Knowledge
   2. Skepticism
   3. Cartesian Skepticism
   4. Humean Skepticism
      1. Numerical vs. Qualitative Identity
      2. Hume’s Skepticism about Induction
5. Conclusion
6. References and Further Reading

Theory of Knowledge

Theory of Knowledge

• What is Knowledge?
  • Types of Knowledge
    • Personal Knowledge
    • Procedural Knowledge
    • Propositional Knowledge
  • The Tripartite Theory of Knowledge
    • Gettier Cases
    • Knowledge Without Belief?
• Sources of Knowledge
  • Rationalism
  • Empiricism
• Epistemic Justification
  • Foundationalism
    • Basic Beliefs Make No Sense
    • Basic Beliefs Can’t Support a Useful Belief Set
    • The Choice of Basic Beliefs is Arbitrary
  • Coherentism
    • Coherent Alternatives
    • Coherence and Truth
  • Reliabilism
    • Multiple Methods of Belief-Formation
    • Reliabilism is Unfair
• Theories of Perception
  • Naive Realism
  • Representative Realism
  • Idealism
  • Phenomenalism
• Scepticism
  • Sceptical Arguments
    • The Argument from Error
    • The Argument from Dreaming
    • The Argument from Deception
  • Responses to Scepticism
    • Moore’s Appeal to Common Sense
    • Austin’s Linguistic Argument
    • Ryle’s Counterfeit Coinage Argument
    • Lewis’s Contextualism

Edmund Gettier: Is Justified True Belief Knowledge?

Much ado about contemporary skepticism has to do with a famously concise article Is Justified True Belief Knowledge? by Edmund L. Gettier that appeared in Analysis 23 (1963), pp. 121-123.

Thanks to the permission of the author and the efforts of Andrew Chrucky it is also available as a hypertext transcription at:
http://www.ditext.com/gettier/gettier.html

Various attempts have been made in recent years to state necessary and sufficient conditions for someone’s knowing a given proposition. The attempts have often been such that they can be stated in a form similar to the following:

a. S knows that P

IFF

P is true, S believes that P, and S is justified in believing that P.

For example, Chisholm has held that the following gives the necessary and sufficient conditions for knowledge:

b. S knows that P

IFF

S accepts P, S has adequate evidence for P, and P is true.

Ayer has stated the necessary and sufficient conditions for knowledge as follows:

c. S knows that P

IFF

P is true, S is sure that P is true, and S has the right to be sure that P is true.

I shall argue that (a) is false in that the conditions stated therein do not constitute a sufficient condition for the truth of the proposition that S knows that P. The same argument will show that (b) and (c) fail if ‘has adequate evidence for’ or ‘has the right to be sure that’ is substituted for ‘is justified in believing that’ throughout.
…

Some related resources:

• Gettier Problem @ Wikipedia
• The Gettier Problem @ philpapers
• Gettier Problems @ Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy
• Gettier Problem @ Indiana Philosophy Ontology Project
• On the Logical Unsolvability of the Gettier Problem