A direct realist account of perceptual awareness
- Probability & Coherence
Refutation of BonJour’s argument for coherentism. Appeared in Southern Journal of Philosophy, Winter 1997.
- Confirmation Theory
Discussion of the problem of induction, some failed solutions to it, and my favored approach: inference to the best explanation
- The Problem of Defeasible Justification
Sets forth a general skeptical argument concerning defeasible justification. Generalizes on problem of induction and Cartesian/brain-in-the-vat skepticism. Close attention to general logical/epistemological principles the problem depends on
- The Problem of Memory Knowledge
Why are we justified in believing what we seem to remember? I refute three natural theories of this and then present my own solution
- Sense Data
Article from the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy
- Explanation & Inductive Logic
Explains how the notion of explanatory priority helps us to properly interpret the Principle of Indifference, leading to a defense of induction
- Skepticism and the Veil of Perception
Information about and excerpts from the book
“Die Analyse des Wissensbegriffs ist eine der Hauptaufgaben der Erkenntnistheorie. Dies spiegelt die aktuelle Diskussion wieder: Nachdem die enorme Flut von Aufsätzen, die Edmund L. Gettiers Frage „Is Justified True Belief Knowledge?“ 1963 ausgelöst hatte, in den 80er Jahren zusehends abebbte, hat gerade das letzte Jahrzehnt wieder eine Fülle von interessanten Neuansätzen und Weiterentwicklungen bekannter Positionen gebracht.”
- 1. Grundlagen
- 2. Internalistische Theorien des Wissens
- 3. Externalistische Theorien des Wissens
- 4. Naturalisierte Erkenntnistheorie
- 5. Tugendepistemologie
- 6. Kontextualistische Theorien des Wissens
- 7. Jenseits des Kontextualismus
Certain Doubts, a blog devoted to matters epistemic, began on June 9, 2004. The blog was originally sponsored by the University of Missouri when its administrator Jonathan L. Kvanvig was professor of philosophy and chair of the philosophy department there. It has since moved to Baylor University, being housed there since the fall of 2006.
The list of contributors is a who’s who of contemporary epistemology, and any epistemologists who are not on the list should feel free to contact the site administrator if they wish to be a contributor.
- 1. What is Knowledge?
- 2. What is Justification?
- 3. The Structure of Knowledge and Justification
- 4. Sources of Knowledge and Justification
- 5. The Limits of Knowledge and Justification
- 6. Additional Issues
- Academic Tools
- Other Internet Resources
- Related Entries
- 1. Some Detailed Epistemology Course Pages
- 2. Links to Links to Philosophy Papers On the Web
- 3. Other Sites Devoted to Contemporary Analytic Epistemology
- 4. Epistemology Blogs
- 5. Bibliographic Resources in Epistemology
- 6. Encyclopedia Articles on Epistemology
- 7. Buying Philosophy Books Online
- 8. Links To 1247 Online Papers In Contemporary Analytic Epistemology + Epistemologist’s Home Pages
- Kinds of Knowledge
- The Nature of Propositional Knowledge
- The Nature of Justification
- The Extent of Human Knowledge
- References and Further Reading
- What is Knowledge?
- Sources of Knowledge
- Epistemic Justification
- Theories of Perception
Thanks to the permission of the author and the efforts of Andrew Chrucky it is also available as a hypertext transcription at:
Various attempts have been made in recent years to state necessary and sufficient conditions for someone’s knowing a given proposition. The attempts have often been such that they can be stated in a form similar to the following:
a. S knows that P IFF
- P is true,
- S believes that P, and
- S is justified in believing that P.
For example, Chisholm has held that the following gives the necessary and sufficient conditions for knowledge:
b. S knows that P IFF
- S accepts P,
- S has adequate evidence for P, and
- P is true.
Ayer has stated the necessary and sufficient conditions for knowledge as follows:
c. S knows that P IFF
- P is true,
- S is sure that P is true, and
- S has the right to be sure that P is true.
I shall argue that (a) is false in that the conditions stated therein do not constitute a sufficient condition for the truth of the proposition that S knows that P. The same argument will show that (b) and (c) fail if ‘has adequate evidence for’ or ‘has the right to be sure that’ is substituted for ‘is justified in believing that’ throughout.
Some related resources: